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 Abstract 
I analyze the impact of food price inflation on parental decisions to send their 
children to school.* Moreover, I use the fact that food crop farmers and cotton 
farmers were exposed differently to that shock to estimate the income elasticity 
of school enrolment. The results suggest that the shock-induced loss in 
purchasing power had an immediate effect on enrolment rates. Instrumental 
variable estimates show that the effect of household income on children’s 
school enrolment is much larger than a simple OLS regression would suggest. 
Hence, policies to expand education in Sub-Saharan Africa should not neglect 
the demand side. 
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1 Introduction
These days many low income countries are confronted with rapidly rising food
prices. This reduces in particular the purchasing power of the poor, given that
they generally spend a large part of their income on food. Behind this back-
ground the United Nations’ World Food Programme warns of the catastrophic
effects of rising food prices on hunger and poverty.1
To assess the consequences of excessive food price inflation on household
outcomes in poor countries it might be helpful to look at the past, given that
most poor countries, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa, are frequently con-
fronted with periods of rising food prices as a result of variations in agricultural
production due to climatic shocks.
In the second half of the nineties, Burkina Faso was confronted with such a
substantial increase in food prices. This was caused by, among other things, a
severe drought which hit the country in 1997/98. Following the drought and a
resulting substantial decline in agricultural output, prices of the three main food
crops, sorghum, millet and maize increased by more than 40 percent. These
food crops account in normal times for about 30 percent of total expenditure
(including imputed expenditures for own production) for rural households in
the poorest quintile of the expenditure distribution.
In a context of incomplete financial markets, as in most parts of Sub-Saharan
Africa, households confronted with such shocks have to rely on strategies such
as the depletion of assets, increased labor supply and the withdrawal of children
from school to meet their basic needs (see e.g., Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997). I
analyze whether food price inflation, through its effect on real household income,
led to reduced school enrolment in Burkina Faso.
To identify the causal impact of household income on investments in chil-
dren’s education, I use the fact that at the same time as food prices increased,
cotton exports increased as well, driven by the devaluation of the CFA Franc
in 1994, a favourable development of the world market price and a significant
expansion of land used for cotton production. This boom prevented the real
income of cotton farmers from declining as much as that of food crop farmers.
In other words I use the distinct development of real incomes between food
crop farmers and cotton farmers between 1994 and 1998 to identify the income
elasticity of children’s school enrolment. Obviously, estimates of that elasticity
based on a simple regression of schooling on income would probably be biased
due to simultaneity, unobserved heterogeneity and possibly measurement error.
Identifying this effect is not only important in understanding the conse-
quences of food-price-inflation-induced declines in real income on children’s
schooling, but also, more generally, to understand to what extent household
income matters for children’s education in poor rural settings. If income mat-
ters, policy makers may consider taking a more balanced view on the supply
and demand side of education. Cash transfers to households or investments in
infrastructure or agricultural productivity to increase the earning capacity of
households may have to complement standard education policies such as the
1See http://www.wfp.org/.
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construction of schools and the training of teachers in the African context.
In the literature there is an intense debate about the role of parental income
on children’s schooling. However, most of the evidence comes from developed
countries or from the analysis of conditional cash transfer programs in Latin-
America and some parts of South-Asia. Given the conditionality in these latter
programs it is generally difficult to derive from them the direct effect of parental
income. In addition, so far there there is only little evidence from Sub-Saharan
Africa, although this region has the lowest education levels in the world.
In the coming years enormous financial resources will be allocated by gov-
ernments and international donors to increase school enrolment in that region.
Hence information of the type mentioned above is important in deciding how
to spend these resources in the most effective way.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
short review of the relevant literature. Section 3 discusses the economic context
in Burkina Faso and provides some information about the education system.
Section 4 presents the data sources. Section 5 first analyzes descriptively the
effect of food price inflation on children’s schooling and then estimates the
income elasticity of enrolment using the setting described above. Section 6
concludes.
2 A review of the literature
Various papers have analyzed the impact of transitory and unanticipated in-
come shocks on indicators related to children’s schooling in poor rural settings.
The theoretical background of these papers is that under liquidity constraints,
caused by the lack of insurance and limited possibilities to smooth consumption
through credit and savings, the standard human capital investment model of
child labor and schooling decisions introduced by Schultz (1960) and formalized
by Ben-Porath (1967) does not apply. As pointed out by Baland and Robinson
(2000), if parents face such constraints then, in the event of a negative shock,
they have to trade off the future benefits of educating their children against
their current consumption needs. Therefore children are not enrolled or drop
out of school in order to contribute to household income and to help maintain
current consumption, even if the return to child labor is below the return of
education.
Using data for Peru, Jacoby (1994) was one of the first who empirically
showed that income shocks can have a notable impact on school attendance in
poor settings. He emphasized that this effect stemmed mainly from those house-
holds which were credit constrained, as measured by the predicted probability
of having positive savings or outstanding non-business loans. In another pa-
per, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) focused in particular on the impact of seasonal
fluctuations in the income of agrarian households, distinguishing aggregate from
idiosyncratic and anticipated from unanticipated income shocks. Using panel
data from India, the authors found that small farm households were inade-
quately insured ex ante, and, hence, unanticipated income shocks significantly
affected children’s school attendance. They also found that households, again
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in particular smaller farm households, faced serious credit market constraints,
sometimes combined with limited storage opportunities, which again had ad-
verse impacts on children’s school attendance.
Kazianga (2005) used similar panel data for six villages in rural Burkina
Faso, the country on which this paper also focuses. He also pointed to the po-
tential benefit of informal insurance mechanisms. He showed that for households
without any access to insurance the frequency of income shocks, as measured
by the predicted income variance, reduced educational investments in boys and,
in particular, in girls.
Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti (2006) used panel data for Tanzania to examine
the extent to which transitory income shocks led to increases in child labor
and whether household’s asset holdings mitigated the effects of these shocks.
For this purpose they regressed child labor hours on an interaction term of
asset ownership and shocks controlling for household fixed effects and a number
of time varying household characteristics. They found that crop shocks led
to a significant increase in the level of child labor, but that households with
assets were able to offset at least a large part of that shock. Richer households
tended to prefer to use their assets as collateral against credit, whereas poorer
households tended to prefer to use them as a buffer. However, school enrolment
decreased less than expected because many children were able to combine school
and work.
Other papers focused on child labor and children’s school enrolment in the
context of economic crisis. Thomas, Beegle, Frankenberg et al. (2004), for
instance, analyzed the effects of the financial crisis in Indonesia on children’s
school enrolment, by relating income to school enrolment and education spend-
ing. They found a substantial effect on schooling in particular in poorer house-
holds. However, poorer households had a tendency to protect the education
investments of older children at the expense of younger ones.
All these studies show convincingly that the level and variance of household
income matter for children’s schooling if households have only limited insur-
ance and limited possibilities to smooth their consumption through credit and
savings. However, these studies do not intend to provide an accurate estimate
of the income elasticity of enrolment, which could be used to design safety nets,
such as conditional or unconditional cash transfer programs, which would help
households to overcome such shocks without withdrawing their children from
school. To get an idea of how much income has to be transferred, one needs to
know the income elasticity of enrolment, once the effects of reverse causality and
omitted variables, in particular parents’ unobserved preferences and abilities,
have been controlled for.
For industrialized countries the causal impact of parental income on chil-
dren’s educational attainment is being intensively studied using either panel
data (see e.g., Blau, 1999; Aughinbaugh and Gittleman, 2003) or instrumen-
tal variables (see e.g., Shea, 2000; Maurin, 2002; Chevalier, Harmon, O’Sullivan
and Walker, 2005), the latter more and more often based on natural experiments
(see e.g., Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2005; Løken, 2007). The different iden-
tifying assumptions made in these studies can of course be subject to debate
and it is difficult to draw a sharp conclusion. It is also plausible that the effect
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differs by country and time even within the group of industrialized countries.
However, it seems that income effects in richer countries are relatively weak
and that often the effect of omitted parental abilities dominates, i.e. the OLS
estimate of the income effect is rather upward than downward biased, but there
are exceptions (e.g. Maurin, 2002).
For developing countries this literature is relatively limited. Behrman and
Wolfe (1987) used sibling data to analyze the respective roles of unobserved
family backgrounds, parental education and income in Nicaragua. They showed
that the impact of parental education is strongly reduced once family fixed ef-
fects are introduced. They did not find an effect of various measures of parental
income on children’s schooling. However, the use of family fixed effects in such a
context is often criticized for inappropriately assuming that unobserved abilities
are constant across siblings (see e.g., Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001).
Cogneau and Maurin (2003) offer one of the rare studies which investigated
the issue for a Sub-Saharan African country, Madagascar. They instrumented
parental income by the difference in parental and grand-parental education. Us-
ing past educational achievements ensures that the instrument is uncorrelated
with the error term and transitory income. By taking the first difference, they
eliminate the family fixed effect. In contrast to the results found Behrman and
Wolfe (1987), their instrumented income effect is three to four times larger than
the non-instrumented effect. Parental education becomes almost insignificant,
suggesting that parental education is rather a proxy for permanent income.2
Other studies relied on natural experiments, as this study will do. Rucci
(2004) looked at changes in enrolment rates during the Argentinean crisis and
instruments household income by the lagged Brazilian Real-US Dollar exchange
rate. She also found the IV estimate, depending on age and gender of the child,
to be two to seven times larger than the OLS estimate. Cogneau and Jedwab
(2008) took cocoa price shocks in Coˆte d’Ivoire as an instrument for income
and explored the difference in investments in children’s education and health
in families of cocoa and food crop farmers. Regarding the effects on education,
they find an income elasticity of primary school enrolment which is three to
four times higher than an elasticity estimated by OLS. For instance, for the age
group five to eleven years old, they found that an increase in income by ten
percent increased enrolment by almost three percent.3
This paper contributes in two ways to the literature discussed above. First,
it provides further evidence that an unanticipated transitory shock on (real)
household income, such as a temporary hike in food prices, has an immediate
effect on children’s school enrolment, suggesting that other risk-coping instru-
ments are insufficient. Second, it provides a relatively accurate estimate of the
causal impact of household income on children’s school enrolment in a very
poor rural African setting.
2Behrman and Knowles (1999) survey a large number of other studies. However, most of
them do not address the limitations regarding the use of current annual income or expendi-
tures.
3Jensen (2000) and Kruger (2007) also rely on natural experiments to investigate the impact
of income on education, however, they used reduced form estimators and thus did not provide
an estimate of the income elasticity of enrolment.
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3 Background
3.1 Agricultural production and prices
Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in the world. GDP per capita is
estimated at only PPP US$ 1,213 and according to the Human Development
Index (HDI), the country was ranked 176th out of 177 countries (UNDP, 2007).
The bad performance in terms of the HDI is in particular caused by a very low
education index. The country is landlocked in the middle of West-Africa and
has a population of roughly 13.4 million. The country depends highly on cotton
exports, which account for almost 60 percent of total export earnings, as well
as on international aid. More than 80 percent of the Burkinabe` population lives
in rural areas working predominantly in the agricultural sector, which suffers
from very limited rainfall and recurrent severe droughts.
Figure 1 shows that as a result of the severe drought in 1997/98 total pro-
duction of the three main food crops decreased by almost 20 percent. Although
the production of maize increased during that period, given its relative low
weight in food consumption, maize production could not compensate for the
decline in millet and sorghum production. At the same time cotton production
increased by more than 70 percent.
Figure 1
Production of main cereals and cotton (in tons)
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Notes: Total food means tons of millet, sorghum and maize.
Source: Economic Accounts for the Agricultural Sector, based on Enqueˆte Agricole (data not
available for harvests before 1996).
Figure 2 shows that the prices of cereals rose tremendously between 1994
and 1998. This rise was caused first of all by the production shortage following
the drought. But even before that drought prices tended to rise due to rising
input prices after the devaluation of the CFA Franc in 1994 and a lack of
productivity increases in cereal production, accompanied by continuous high
population growth. In some years a high demand for cereals from neighboring
countries also put pressure on prices in Burkina Faso.
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Figure 2
Consumer prices of main cereals and cotton producer price
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Notes: Annual average prices (collected on 37 different regional markets).
Source: Cereal prices: Grain Market Price Surveillance System, Ministry of Trade. Cotton price:
Ouedraogo, Sanou and Sissao (2003).
Following the devaluation and the favorable development of the world mar-
ket price of cotton, the Burkinabe` cotton marketing board ‘Socie´te´ Burkinabe`
des fibres textiles’ (SOFITEX), which was in place at that time,4 increased the
producer price in several steps. Despite the fact that the costs of inputs also
increased, as most of them have to be imported, the rise in producer prices still
provided enough incentives to expand cotton production, mainly by the expan-
sion of land allocated to cotton production (Grimm and Gu¨nther, 2007a).
After 1998 cereal prices fell back to lower levels, before rising again due to a
second drought in 2000/01. The immediate consequences of the second drought
are difficult to assess, since household survey data only exists for 1994, 1998
and 2003. As Figure 1 shows, in 2002 cereal production had already recovered
and prices for millet and sorghum in particular were significantly lower in 2002
than in 1998.
Obviously such price hikes in food staples can always have two types of
consequences. Households who are net producers of these cereals will benefit,
i.e. the income effect will more than outweigh the price effect. Households who
are net consumers will, in turn, suffer real income losses. Household survey data
for 1998 shows that in rural areas 94 percent of all households produced cereals,
but only 15 percent sold any on the market. In contrast, the share of purchased
cereals in total cereal consumption was on average 49 percent (Grimm and
Gu¨nther, 2007a). Thus, in rural Burkina Faso most of the households should
be losers of such price increases, in particular in periods of harvest failures since
this obviously means also lower output.5
4At that time SOFITEX was the only importer of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer
and pesticides and the only buyer of cotton. For a detailed description of the sector, see e.g.
Kaminski (2007).
5See Reardon, Matlon and Delgado (1988) for similar evidence on Burkina Faso
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It is important to emphasize that the cereal prices shown in Figure 2 are
consumer and not producer prices. The latter are often much lower given the
negotiation power of traders and the information asymmetries prevailing be-
tween traders and farmers. Also, farmers do often not have appropriate storage
facilities and thus are forced to sell their cereals directly after the harvest, re-
sulting in a fall in prices. Traders on the other hand, are able to store cereals,
to speculate in the market and to drive the price up by allocating their supply
over the whole year.
To conclude, the hypothesis is that between 1994 and 1998 food crop farmers
and cotton farmers experienced a substantially different development of (real)
household income given that they were differently exposed to exogenous shocks.
Because of the lack of formal insurance and credit and, as shown by Kazianga
and Udry (2006), the only limited evidence of risk sharing and consumption
smoothing available in Burkina Faso (see also Reardon, Matlon and Delgado
(1996)), the tremendous loss in purchasing power for food crop farmers is likely
to have led to a substantial decline of school enrolment of children living in
these households. In contrast, school enrolment of children living in cotton
households should have been affected less. The latter is of course only true as
long as the income effect was higher than the substitution effect, i.e. children
living in cotton households were not put to work more often given the increased
opportunity cost of schooling. This latter issue will also be addressed below.
3.2 Schooling system
In Burkina Faso basic education includes pre-school classes for a maximum
duration of three years; normally children from three to six years of age can
attend. Primary school starts officially at the age of seven and lasts in total
six years. Upon successful completion, children receive the Certificat d’Etudes
Primaires (CEP) which qualifies for entry into secondary school.
Secondary school is comprised of two types of curricula: the general cur-
riculum and a technical curriculum. Lower secondary education lasts four years
and ends with the Brevet d’Etudes du Premier Cycle (BEPC) for the general
curriculum and with the Certificat d’Aptitude Professionnelle (CAP) for the
technical curriculum. General higher secondary education lasts three years.
Technical higher secondary education can be three years (long) or two years
(short). The respective diplomas are Baccalaure´at (BAC), Brevet de Techni-
cien (BT) and Brevet d’Etudes Professionnelles (BEP). The BAC enables entry
into tertiary education.
In principle school is compulsory for the age group six to sixteen. But
the law explicitly states that this is conditional on the availability of schools,
teaching material and teachers (see e.g., Pilon, 2002). De facto, many children
never go to school or if they do, only for a few years, particularly in rural areas.
In addition, school entry is often delayed, repetition rates are high and there is
still an important, although decreasing, gender gap in rural areas.
The schooling system is comprised of public and private schools. Private
schools charge fees. Public schools are always free of charge and parents only
have to buy pens, paper, books and a school uniform. Until 2007 it was also
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custom that parents paid 1,000 CFA F (about 10 PPP US$) each year into the
parents’ association. However, this was abolished in 2007. Today, public and
private schools receive text books from the government.
4 Data
I use three nationwide representative household survey data sets, so-called
Enqueˆte Prioritaires (EP), undertaken in 1994 (EP I), 1998 (EP II) and 2003
(EP III) covering around 8,500 households in each year. These surveys were con-
ducted by the Institut National de la Statistique et de la De´mographie (INSD)
with technical and financial support by the World Bank. These surveys contain
relatively detailed information on households’ socio-demographic characteris-
tics, education, employment, agricultural and non-agricultural activities as well
as consumption, income and some assets. A detailed description of these data
sets can be found in Grimm and Gu¨nther (2007b).
Information on school enrolment is provided for all children older than five
years. For all individuals who ever attended school, the surveys asked for the
highest education level ever achieved. For children older than nine, the surveys
also inform us whether a child worked, e.g. on the household’s farm or non-farm
business or outside the household.
Given the usual low quality of income data in poor rural settings, I use
household expenditure per capita as a measure of households’ income. The
expenditure aggregate includes self-produced consumption and imputed rents.
Expenditures were deflated over time and space using temporal and regional
price deflators. Given the tremendous changes in relative prices in the second
half of the nineties mentioned above, e.g. the substantial rise in cereal prices and
the significant differences in consumption habits across the income distribution,
I use decile-specific price indices to deflate expenditures over time. Using only
the general consumer price index would over-estimate the living standard of the
poor. This is shown in detail in Grimm and Gu¨nther (2007b, 2007c).
All those farmers who produced at least one kg of cotton in the survey year
are coded as cotton farmers. Of course most of these farmers also produce some
food crops. All other farmers are coded as food crop farmers. However, I will
test the sensitivity of that definition to alternative assumptions. It should be
noted that cotton farmers are, similarly to food crop farmers, usually small
family farms with in most cases not more than a few hectares of land.
In what follows I restrict my sample to two relatively homogenous and well
defined groups, namely food crop farmers and cotton farmers, and exclude pure
livestock farmers and all other socio-economic groups. I only consider rural
areas and limit the sample to households in the South and South-West of the
country, excluding the relatively dry tropical savannah in the north.6 Applying
6The narrow spatial and socio-economic definition of both groups to be compared ensures
that this comparison is not affected by other shocks which might have occurred during that
time. For instance, livestock farmers faced a different development in their production and in
prices than pure food crop farmers. Urban households have suffered more under the price rise
of imported food items than have rural households. Moreover, in the North there are only few
cotton farmers, which would make a comparison with other farmers in this area somewhat
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those criteria reduces the sample to in total 6,610 households for all three years
together. The area is indicated on the map in Figure 3. Although one can find
cotton cultivation almost everywhere in the country, in this area more than 80
percent of the total cotton exports are produced.
Figure 3
Provinces included in empirical analysis
Source: United Nations (map).
5 Empirical Evidence
5.1 Income
Table 1 shows the development of real household expenditure per capita. The
shock on cereal output and the resulting food price inflation reducing the pur-
chasing power of households are clearly visible. On average expenditures de-
creased by almost 24 percent in real terms. Afterwards households recovered
and attained a living standard in 2003 which was slightly above that of 1994.
fragile.
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Table 1
Real yearly household expenditure per capita
(in 1000 CFA Francs, population weighted)
1994 1998 2003
All Farm Househ. 61.7 47.0 64.3
(-23.8) (36.7)
Cotton Househ. 62.0 52.0 71.0
(-16.1) (36.5)
Food Crop Househ. 61.5 43.4 59.4
(-29.4) (36.9)
Notes: In parentheses total percentage increase relative to previous period.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations by the author.
Comparing cotton farmers with food crop farmers, one can state that both
groups had a similar living standard in 1994. Then, between 1994 and 1998
real expenditures of food crop farmers decreased by almost 30 percent, whereas
the real expenditure of cotton farmers decreased by ‘only’ 16 percent. Between
1998 and 2003, both groups again saw a very similar growth rate of about 37
percent over the whole period.
5.2 School enrolment
Column (1) in Table 2 shows the temporal pattern of enrolment rates for chil-
dren six to thirteen years old living either in food crop or cotton farmer house-
holds. This pattern is obtained by regressing enrolment status on cotton and
year dummies and cotton and year interaction terms. The regression also con-
trols for age (coefficients not presented), relationship to the household head i.e.
child of the head or not (coefficient not presented), gender and the interaction
of gender, cotton and year effects. Note that on average only 22 percent of boys
and 15 percent of girls within that age group are enrolled in school.
The results suggest that children in cotton households have, on average, the
same probability to be enrolled as children in food crop households. The cotton
dummy is not statistically significant. In 1998 all children were significantly less
likely to be enrolled than in 1994 and 2003. In that year the enrolment proba-
bility was on overage 8.7 percent lower than in the two other years. However,
for children in cotton households this effect was on average much lower. The
corresponding coefficient of the cotton-year interaction indicates that in 1998
these children had a probability to be enrolled which was higher by 6.4 percent.
This interaction effect is insignificant in 2003.7
The other control variables indicate, as one can expect in the given context,
that boys have, in general, a higher probability to be enrolled in school than
girls. But it is interesting to see that in 1998 girls were less affected by delayed
entry and school dropouts than boys. This could be explained by the higher
opportunity costs for the schooling for boys. Below I will analyze this issue in
more detail. However, it should already be noted that the interaction term of
7The results are qualitatively the same, if a probit model is estimated.
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‘being a boy’ and ‘being a child of a cotton household’ is insignificant. That
suggests that in this age group boys in cotton households are on average not
more likely to be enrolled or to be at work than boys in food crop households.
Table 2
Temporal pattern of differential enrolment rates and school expenditures
Cotton vs. Food Crop Households
Regression effects
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Tobit Tobit
School enrollment Schooling expend. Schooling expend.
6-13 years old per househ. member per child 6-13 y. old
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Cotton Househ. -0.001 0.029 0.795 0.511 0.989 * 0.566
Year 1998 -0.081 *** 0.022 -1.398 *** 0.327 -1.401 *** 0.365
Year 2003 -0.005 0.024 -0.305 0.330 -0.166 0.367
Cotton × Year 1998 0.064 ** 0.032 1.462 ** 0.620 1.288 * 0.688
Cotton × Year 2003 -0.019 0.033 -0.372 0.617 -0.778 0.685
Boy 0.101 *** 0.023
Boy × Cotton 0.011 0.017
Boy × Year 1998 -0.044 * 0.025
Boy × Year 2003 -0.026 0.026
Household Head Male 0.513 0.423 0.880 * 0.476
Observations 12273 6610 6610
(children) (households) (households)
Notes: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and permit within-
family correlations among unobservables. ∗ significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ significant at the
5% level, ∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level. Regression (1) also controls for age and relationship
of child to household head. Intercept included but not reported here. Reference year is 1994.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations by the author.
5.3 Education expenditures
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 2 show the development over time of schooling
expenditures per household member and per child. The results are consistent
with the impact observed for school enrolment: a general decline in schooling
expenditures in 1998, but a positive and highly significant impact of the cotton-
year interaction term in 1998. Thus in 1998 cotton households reduced their
schooling expenditures significantly less than food crop farmers. The linear
year effect in combination with the interaction effect even suggest that there
was no reduction at all for children in cotton households. The cotton dummy is
insignificant in column (2) and weakly significant in column (3), i.e. in normal
times, there is hardly any difference in schooling expenditures between food
crop and cotton farmers.
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5.4 Child work
Table (3) shows the results of a multinomial logit regression. The dependent
variable is a categorical variable taking the value ‘one’ if the child only attends
school, ‘two’ if the child attends school and works, ‘three’ if the child only
works and ‘four’ if the child neither attends school nor works. Information
on activities other than schooling is available for children 10 years and older.
Hence, I include the age group ten to thirteen in the regression. This is different
to the age group considered in Table 2.
Table 3
Temporal pattern of school enrolment, child work and inactivity
Cotton vs. Food Crop Households, Children 10 to 13 years old
Marginal effects from a multinomial logit, enrolment is baseline outcome
School and work Work Inactivity
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Cotton Househ. 0.012 * 0.012 0.093 * 0.045 -0.028 0.017
Year 1998 -0.030 * 0.011 0.143 * 0.039 -0.056 ** 0.013
Year 2003 -0.053 *** 0.011 0.038 0.040 -0.018 * 0.010
Cotton × Year 1998 0.027 0.021 -0.185 *** 0.058 0.038 0.033
Cotton × Year 2003 -0.019 0.009 -0.055 0.057 0.006 0.023
Boy 0.014 * 0.008 0.013 0.038 -0.075 *** 0.017
Boy × Cotton -0.013 * 0.008 -0.012 0.030 0.016 0.017
Boy × Year 1998 0.004 0.010 -0.061 0.045 0.036 0.025
Boy × Year 2003 0.059 0.048 -0.122 0.054 0.056 * 0.029
Observations 5319
Notes: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and permit within-
family correlations among unobservables. Stars refer to standard errors of regression coeffi-
cients, not to those of marginal effects. ∗ significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ significant at the 5%
level, ∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level. Regression also controls for age and relationship of child
to household head. Intercept included but not reported here. Reference year is 1994.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations by the author.
Child work is relatively widespread among children ten to thirteen years
old. In the study area between 60 and 70 percent of all children do some work
without attending school and another five to ten percent combine school and
work. Children who work help, in most cases, on the family farm (more than
90 percent of all cases). Work outside the household is rather an exception.
The surveys do not contain any information on working hours. Children were
only asked what the principal activity was; but for those working and attending
school it was not asked whether one or the other activity was the main activity.
I use the same control variables as in Table 2.
The multivariate analysis shows that in this age group children in cotton
households worked slightly more often than that they attended school or were
inactive than children in food crop households. Moreover, in 1998 all children
were more likely to work than be at school. They were also less likely to combine
work and school or to be inactive, implying that children either worked or
attended school in that year. At the sample mean, the probability of working
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relative to attending school in 1998 is almost 19 percent higher than in 1994
and 2003.
The cotton-time interaction shows that in 1998 children in cotton households
were much more likely than children in food crop households to attend school
rather than to work. This effect is highly significant. In that year, children in
cotton households were also more likely than children in food crop households to
combine school and work rather than only attending school. However, this effect
is only weakly significant. In 2003 these differential effects between children in
cotton and food crop households disappeared again.
Regarding the gender differences, boys had a slightly higher probability than
girls to combine school and work than to attend school only. Boys were less
likely than girls to be inactive. There were no differences between boys and
girls specific to the year 1998. However, in 2003 it seems that boys were less
likely to work than attend school than girls were.
5.5 First conclusions
All results above suggest that food crop farmers were significantly hit by the
drought and the rise in food prices and that they responded to the associated
loss in purchasing power by reducing children’s school enrolment and letting
them work more often. This suggests, as some other studies have found before,
that most rural households in Burkina Faso are unable to smooth consumption
over time through credit and/or savings (Reardon, Matlon and Delgado, 1996;
Kazianga and Udry, 2006). Moreover, the results imply that risk sharing, which
would be possible with cotton farmers, does not happen or, again, happens
only to a very limited extent. However, it is possible that food crop farmers
benefitted to some extent from the cotton boom through a higher demand from
cotton farmers for labor or goods produced by food crop farmers and that
without these effects the impact of the price hike would have been even worse.
It is also important to highlight that child work among cotton farmers did not
increase relative to child work among food crop farmers despite the boom in
the cotton sector.8
5.6 Income elasticity of school enrolment
5.6.1 Identification strategy
The simultaneous shocks induced by the cereal crises and the cotton boom
caused a variation in income over time and household groups, which can help
to identify the causal impact of household income on children’s schooling. I
rely on the period 1994 to 1998 for identification since this is the period in
which both shocks occurred. Before and after that period, income and school
enrolment in both groups of farmers followed a similar dynamic as documented
in the previous sub-sections. I use expenditure as a proxy for income, thus
ignoring the role of savings. This implies that, if consumption smoothing or
8Ferreira and Schady (2008) discuss such income and substitution effects related to aggre-
gate shocks.
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insurance (or both) take place, for which again there is only weak evidence in
Burkina Faso, the relationship which is analyzed is rather between permanent
or average income and schooling than between current income and schooling.
A standard OLS model of the income effect can be written as follows:
Sijt = α+βCottonijt+γY eart+δ ln Incijt+
13∑
k=7
ζkAgeijtk+X
′
ijtη+θj+εijt. (1)
Enrolment, Sijt, is a binary variable taking the value one, if the child i, living
in province j is enrolled in school in year t. Cottonijt takes the value one if
the child lives in a cotton household. Y eart takes the value one if the child is
observed in 1998 (and zero if observed in 1994). The variable ln Incijt stands
for the logarithm of household expenditures. I do not express expenditures
in per capita terms, because this could lead to identification problems in an
enrolment equation, given that fertility and educational investments might be
jointly determined and have the same unobservable determinants. However, if
household composition responds to income shocks, income may have an omitted
variable bias. Whether this is an issue will be examined below. The coefficient
δ measures the income elasticity of school enrolment.
Ageijtk are age-specific dummies for each age group between seven and thir-
teen years with the age of six being the reference group. X ′ijt is a vector of other
household and individual control variables, including parental education, live-
stock and non-farm business ownership, wealth, access to credit, position of the
child in the household, and variables reflecting the composition of the house-
hold. θj are province fixed effects which account for differences in education
supply and other province-specific effects which otherwise might be picked up
by the remaining included variables if these are correlated.9 Given that the
unobservable characteristics of children living in the same household are likely
to be correlated, I use robust standard errors for inference.
An OLS estimate of the income effect above is obviously subject to a num-
ber of biases. In principle, the most important ones are the simultaneity bias
and the omitted variables bias. The simultaneity bias arises if enrolment is a
substitute for child work and thus has a negative impact on household income.
Simultaneity would bias δ downward. Given the extent of child work in Burkina
Faso, it is likely that this bias arises. However, each of the activities—school
and work on the family farm—need not necessarily occupy the whole day; both
can be combined as seen above, probably reducing the downward bias.
Omitted variable bias can stem from a number of causes and can introduce a
downward or upward bias. For instance, unobserved parental abilities may have
a positive impact on income and make it more likely that parents send their
children to school. This would upward bias the income effect. Household income
could also be correlated with better opportunities for children to get a job which
requires a certain level of education. This would increase the expected returns
9One might prefer to include cluster-specific instead of province-specific fixed effects. How-
ever, those units are not constant over time and, hence, I would have to mix the time with
the cluster-specific fixed effects. In addition, that would entail problems for my identification
strategy, given that many of these clusters would not have enough farmers from either group.
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from education and thus again bias the income effect upward. The omission of
parental education, household assets and location-specific characteristics could
also lead to a biased estimate of δ, but these factors can, at least to some extent,
be controlled.10
A further downward bias of the income effect may result from measurement
error in the income variable. Although for most industrialized countries that
bias should be relatively small, in the case of a poor agrarian country that bias
can be very important and may even dominate the two other biases. Household
surveys of the type undertaken in Burkina Faso ask households for pre-specified
recall periods on how much they spent on a specific good or group of goods. The
recall period for food expenditure is usually a week, for clothes, transport etc.
a month and for durables, health and education expenditures a year. Obviously
the potential error in these types of questions is large (see e.g., Deaton, 1997;
and Deaton and Grosh, 2000).
It is not straightforward to get a rough estimate to what extent measurement
error could bias the income effect. Validation surveys are frequently conducted
in industrialized countries (see e.g., Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz, 2001), but
do not exist for the Sub-Saharan African context. One possibility would be to
rely on simulated errors and to make a sensitivity analysis under various as-
sumptions about the variance of the error term and its correlation with income.
This is however left for future work.
In order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the income effect on school en-
rolment, I rely on the distinct development of incomes of food crop and cotton
farmers in the period 1994 to 1998. I use a 2SLS estimator and instrument
income with the interaction effect ‘being a child in a cotton household in 1998’
conditional on ‘being in a cotton household’ and the time effect. Using this
instrumentation strategy, Equation (1) can be rewritten as:
Sijt = α+βCottonijt+γY eart+δ ˆln Incijt+
13∑
k=7
ζkAgeijtk+X
′
ijtη+θj+εijt, (2)
where the first stage equation is given by
ln Incijt = ϑ+ ιCottonijt + κY eart + λ(Y eart × Cottonijt)+
13∑
k=7
µkAgeijtk +X
′
ijtν + ξj + ωijt.
This instrumentation yields a ‘difference-in-difference’ estimator, since it
compares within provinces the difference between 1994 and 1998 in the dif-
ference in school enrolment between children of food crop farmers and cotton
farmers. A similar instrumentation strategy is used by Cogneau and Jedwab
10A detailed discussion why marginal private benefits of schooling are likely to be associated
with household income in the context of a low income country and why a simple OLS estimate
of the income elasticity of schooling might be biased is provided by Behrman and Knowles,
1999).
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(2008) to identify the income elasticity of schooling in Coˆte d’Ivoire.11 Given
the differences in enrolment patterns for boys and girls, I run the regression
separately for boys and girls.12
Obviously a number of assumptions have to be verified to ensure that this
instrumentation is valid and yields an unbiased income effect. First, the in-
strument needs to be relevant. That this is the case, was shown in Table 1.
Whereas food crop farmers and cotton farmers had a similar living standard in
1994, cotton farmers were significantly richer than food crop farmers in 1998.
After 1998, incomes of both groups followed again a similar dynamic. Second,
I assume that being a child in a cotton household in that particular year 1998
is uncorrelated with the error term in the main equation of (2), i.e. the in-
strument does not have any direct impact on school enrolment other than its
impact through income, once the linear effect of time and ‘being a child in a
cotton household’ is controlled for. Note that there is no evidence that chil-
dren in cotton households worked more often following the cotton boom (cf.
Table 3). Third, I assume that children in cotton households and food crop
households would have known the same change in school enrolment over time
in the absence of the shocks on income. Table 2 suggests that this is indeed the
case; the cotton dummy is insignificant and there is no difference in enrolment
rates between children in food crop households and cotton households in 2003
(insignificant interaction effect).
Table 4 shows the set of education related variables in the sample for all
survey years and both types of children, those living in cotton households and
those living in food crop households. There are no significant differences be-
tween both groups regarding the age of the children, gender of the children, the
share of women in the household, age of the household head and the possession
of a non-farm business. Although some of these variables vary over time, like
for instance possession of a non-farm business, this seems to be due to the fact
that the corresponding question was asked slightly differently in each survey.
The difference in the mean age between 1994, 1998 and 2003 is consistent with
the difference of the timing of the interviews in each survey year.
Household heads in cotton households are more often men than in food crop
households, they and their spouses are also slightly better educated (however,
this is partly due to the gender effect in household headship) and cotton house-
holds more often possess livestock and are a bit wealthier. However, they are
credit constrained more often than food crop farmers, although being credit
constrained is only measured rudimentarily. A household is considered to be
credit constrained if it requested an agricultural credit but did not get one. It is
of course possible that households who know that their request will be denied
11Rucci (2004) used both in her study, a simple difference estimator and a difference-in-
difference estimator. To implement the latter she assumes that children of well educated
parents have been differently affected by the Argentinean crisis than children of less educated
parents. She argues that this difference arises because educated parents might be less credit
constrained. However, if this was the case, the measured effect would no longer be a pure
income effect, but an effect due to differences in access to credit.
12The model could also be estimated using a probit specification. However, for interpreta-
tional convenience and to avoid inconsistent estimates given that fixed effects are included, I
use the linear specification.
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never ask for a credit.13 The differences in all these variables are relatively
constant over time. All these variables will be included as control variables in
the regression.
The only issue which needs particular attention are the differences in the
relationship of the children to the household head and household size between
food crop and cotton farmers and the change in these differences over time.
These structural changes could imply that some children living originally in
food crop households were fostered by cotton households when incomes started
to diverge between both groups. Akresh (2005) has provided evidence that, for
instance, households in the Bazega province—which is outside the area which is
covered by this study—rely on child fostering to mitigate shocks. It is difficult
to say how that would bias the estimate of the instrumented income effect. In
another paper, Akresh (2004) shows that the foster children are equally likely
as their host siblings to be enrolled and they are slightly more likely to be
enrolled than their biological siblings, but both the foster children and their
biological siblings experience increased enrolment after the fostering exchange.
If that would also be the case in the context analyzed here, it would mean that
we underestimate the income elasticity of school enrolment. However, the bias
should be moderate, since household size in cotton households increases by less
than 0.3 persons per household. The share of children in the relevant age group
(6-13) increases by only 1.2 percentage points in cotton households and does
not decline (but rather increases) in food crop households.
Finally the instrumentation would pose complications if the cotton boom
provided an incentive to food crop farmers to switch to cotton production. If
those switching households differed in unobservable characteristics correlated
with their decisions regarding children’s school enrolment, the estimated in-
come effect could again be biased. Between 1994 and 1998 the share of cotton
households, i.e. households which produced at least 1kg of cotton, increased
by 13 percentage points from 21 percent to 34 percent. To account for the
potential bias in the estimates due to switching households, I undertake below
a number of robustness checks. For instance, I will introduce an interaction
term for having been a cotton farmer in 1998, but not in 1997. I will also run
the regression by excluding completely from the estimation those who joined
after 1997. I will also change the definition of cotton farmers according to the
amount of cotton produced or according to the share of cotton income in total
agricultural income. Then, alternatively, I exclude from the sample the group
of potential households which switched or attribute them to the group of food
crop farmers and check whether this has any impact on the estimated income
elasticity of schooling.
13In 2005 in Burkina Faso only 22.5 percent of the households benefitted from credits from
micro-lending institutions (African Development Fund, 2006). Cotton farmers have in addition
access to credit to finance their inputs such as seeds and fertilizer, but these credits cannot
be used to cover other expenditures.
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Table 4
Characteristics of children (6 to 13 years old) and the households they live in
1994 1998 2003
Food crop Cotton Food crop Cotton Food crop Cotton
Age 9.054 9.055 9.202 9.184 9.205 9.113
Boy 0.540 0.552 0.533 0.545 0.514 0.516
Child of househ. head 0.783 0.821 0.872 0.773 0.880 0.899
Household Size 9.101 10.959 8.795 11.213 8.051 9.067
Share women in househ. 0.496 0.477 0.509 0.492 0.522 0.505
Share children 6-13 in househ. 0.294 0.277 0.323 0.289 0.314 0.298
Household head male 0.914 0.967 0.919 0.974 0.896 0.978
Household head age 46.358 45.229 47.711 47.318 47.830 46.260
Househ. head migrated last 5 years 0.062 0.025 0.066 0.055 n.a. n.a.
Househ. head some primary 0.061 0.089 0.060 0.090 0.066 0.097
Househ. head primary completed 0.028 0.056 0.029 0.055 0.030 0.057
Spouse of head some primary 0.045 0.054 0.047 0.051 0.047 0.059
Household owns livestock 0.669 0.776 0.798 0.920 0.796 0.933
Household owns non-farm business 0.516 0.596 0.266 0.276 0.391 0.358
Value of asset index -0.757 -0.514 -0.836 -0.400 -0.785 -0.544
Household credit constrained 0.035 0.046 0.036 0.072 0.269 0.384
Notes: The means of ‘Age’, ‘Boy’ and ‘Child of household head’ are computed over all chil-
dren. The remaining variables are means over all households to which the children belong.
The questionnaire on ‘Non farm business’ varies slightly from year to year. The asset index
includes ownership of the following assets: radio, TV, bike, motorbike, fridge, connection to
electricity, connection to taped water, modern toilet, good floor and wall materials. The index
is computed on the national level using principal component analysis. The national average
is normalized to zero in each year. A household is defined as credit constrained if it asked for
agricultural credit but did not get it.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; computations by the author.
5.6.2 Results
Table 5 shows the estimation results. For boys the OLS estimate in column (1)
suggests that a ten percent increase in household income leads to an increase
in the probability of being enrolled of 0.64 percent, controlling for age, house-
hold composition, parental education, livestock ownership, non-farm business
ownership and province fixed effects. For girls (column (7)) this elasticity is
0.49 percent. Both coefficients are highly significant. The cotton dummy is
insignificant, supporting the identification strategy for the income effect below.
The 1998 year dummy indicates that in 1998 enrolment rates were on average
lower by seven percentage points for boys and 4.5 percentage points for girls.
Parental education has (or more precisely education of the household head and
his/her spouse) a significant positive impact on enrolment rates, in particular
for girls. Ownership of a private non-farm business also has a positive impact,
in particular for boys. This can be due either to a wealth effect or to a returns
on education effect. If education is particularly valuable for the ‘management’
of a non-farm business, parents owning such a business may invest more in the
education of their children. Livestock ownership has no significant impact.
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Table 5
The income elasticity of school enrolment, 1994 – 1998
Children 6 to 13 years old
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Boys
Main equation
Cotton Househ. -0.012 0.022 -0.040 0.028 -0.010 0.021 -0.040 0.027 -0.011 0.022 -0.019 0.021
Year 1998 -0.071 *** 0.019 -0.092 *** 0.021 -0.075 *** 0.018 -0.094 *** 0.020 -0.072 *** 0.019 -0.114 *** 0.031
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.064 *** 0.012 0.268 ** 0.120 0.029 ** 0.013 0.265 ** 0.127 0.067 *** 0.015 0.373 ** 0.187
HH head some primary 0.101 *** 0.034 0.088 ** 0.035 0.079 ** 0.034 0.081 ** 0.034 0.100 *** 0.034 0.065 0.041
Spouse some primary 0.190 *** 0.053 0.151 *** 0.051 0.154 *** 0.059 0.140 *** 0.047 0.189 *** 0.053 0.137 *** 0.053
HH owns livestock -0.016 0.022 -0.099 * 0.053 -0.011 0.021 -0.100 * 0.052 -0.015 0.022 -0.074 * 0.042
HH owns non-agri. bus. 0.072 *** 0.019 0.041 0.025 0.053 *** 0.018 0.035 * 0.019 0.073 *** 0.019 0.050 ** 0.022
Wealth index 0.075 *** 0.010 0.020 0.031
Credit constrained 0.036 0.054 -0.014 0.057
HH size (Square root) -0.006 0.012 -0.136 * 0.081
Provincial fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
First stage
IV: Being a cotton
farmer in 1998 0.291 *** 0.050 0.274 *** 0.048 0.196 *** 0.044
F -Stat 33.5 32.9 19.7
Observations 4359 4359 4359 4359 4359 4359
Notes: See next page.
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Table 5 (... continued.)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Girls
Main equation
Cotton Househ. 0.009 0.022 -0.042 0.043 0.007 0.022 -0.038 0.034 0.015 0.022 -0.005 0.026
Year 1998 -0.045 ** 0.018 -0.077 *** 0.027 -0.047 *** 0.018 -0.074 *** 0.022 -0.049 *** 0.018 -0.094 *** 0.036
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.049 *** 0.012 0.308 * 0.183 0.019 0.012 0.297 * 0.160 0.066 *** 0.015 0.363 * 0.217
HH head some primary 0.161 *** 0.040 0.140 *** 0.038 0.147 *** 0.039 0.147 *** 0.035 0.155 *** 0.039 0.108 ** 0.048
Spouse some primary 0.158 *** 0.048 0.123 ** 0.054 0.128 *** 0.047 0.134 *** 0.048 0.161 *** 0.047 0.142 *** 0.047
HH owns livestock 0.037 0.023 -0.067 0.076 0.038 * 0.023 -0.059 0.059 0.040 * 0.023 -0.034 0.057
HH owns non-agri. bus. 0.030 * 0.017 -0.016 0.036 0.017 0.017 -0.009 0.021 0.033 * 0.017 0.009 0.023
Wealth index 0.058 *** 0.012 -0.018 0.044
Credit constrained 0.048 0.040 0.003 0.047
HH size (Square root) -0.028 ** 0.012 -0.152 * 0.092
Provincial fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
First stage
IV: Being a cotton
farmer in 1998 0.189 *** 0.057 0.213 *** 0.053 0.160 *** 0.049
F -Stat 11.1 16.3 10.6
Observations 3708 3708 3708 3708 3708 3708
Notes: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and permit within-family correlations among unobservables. ∗ significant at the
10% level, ∗∗ significant at the 5% level, ∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level. Regressions control also for age, being the eldest child in the household, being a child
of the household head, the share of female household members, the share of children 6-13 years old in the household and whether the household head is a
male. Intercept included but not reported here. The first-stage regression includes also all other variables from the main equation as instruments. Base year
for year effects is 1994.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations by the author.
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If income is instrumented (columns (2) and (8)) the income effect rises sub-
stantially. For boys the income effect increases to 0.268, suggesting that an
increase of income by 10 percent increases the probability of enrolment, on av-
erage, by 2.7 percent: that is roughly four times the effect suggested by the
OLS regression. The F -statistic in the corresponding first-stage regression is
far above the critical value of ten, indicating again that the used instrument is
relevant. For girls the instrumented income effect is even higher than for boys
and again, the F -statistic indicates that the instrument is relevant. The cotton
dummy is still insignificant. The effects of parental education decrease signif-
icantly, for both boys and girls, showing that a simple OLS estimation under-
states the income effect and overstates the parental education effect. Business
ownership is no longer significant. The comparison of the OLS income effect
with the instrumented income effect suggests that the simultaneity bias and the
measurement error bias probably dominate, provided that the omitted variable
bias would rather upward than downward bias the OLS effect.
In columns (3), (4), (9) and (10) I introduce as additional regressors a
wealth index and the above-mentioned measure of access to credit. Introducing
these controls can avoid a bias which could stem from the fact that cotton
households have on average higher wealth holdings than food crop households.
Both controls lower the OLS income effect, but do not alter the instrumented
income effect. Finally, I add the square root of household size as a control
variable (columns (5), (6), (7) and (8)) to account for the fact that households
may respond to income shocks by adjusting their household size. Indeed, if
household size is controlled, the instrumented income effect increases further,
showing that income and household size are positively correlated. As I discussed
above, it is possible that some cotton households fostered children from food
crop households which then led to lower income growth in per capita terms
than in absolute terms. This can also explain the lower F -statistic, though still
above ten for boys and girls.
5.6.3 Robustness checks
If households who started to grow cotton after 1994 differed in their unobserv-
able characteristics correlated with their decisions regarding children’s school
enrolment, the estimated income effect could be biased. In order to test the
robustness of the estimates in Table 5, with respect to this issue, I re-estimate
the model under various alternative assumptions. Table 6 shows the results.
First, I introduce in Equation (2) an interaction term between ‘being a cot-
ton farmer in 1998’ and ‘having not been a cotton farmer the season before’
(i.e. in 1996/97).14 For boys, the income effects for both estimations, OLS and
IV, remain more or less unchanged. The F -statistic of the first-stage regression
of the IV estimation goes even further up, showing that once controlled for the
‘newcomer status’, ‘being a cotton farmer in 1998’ is even more strongly corre-
lated with income. For girls, the interaction term is significantly positive. The
F -statistic goes down and the instrumented income effect becomes insignificant,
although the size of the income effect is not much altered.
14In absence of panel data, I cannot refer to the the season 1993/94.
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Table 6
The income elasticity of school enrolment, 1994 – 1998 — Robustness checks
Children 6 to 13 years old
Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Interaction term: Household was not a cotton household in previous year
Cotton Househ. -0.015 0.023 -0.047 0.030 -0.010 0.024 -0.054 0.044
Cotton × No Cott. in t− 1 0.013 0.033 0.041 0.033 0.081 ** 0.037 0.097 *** 0.034
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.064 *** 0.012 0.249 ** 0.111 0.050 *** 0.012 0.253 0.171
First stage F -Stat 37.9 11.8
Without those households having not been a cotton hh in previous year (removes 6.5% of all boys (7.0% of all girls))
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.060 *** 0.013 0.269 *** 0.103 0.050 *** 0.012 0.239 * 0.144
First stage F -Stat 44.6 16.3
Without those households having produced less than 50kg cotton (removes 4.5% (4.0%) from sample)
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.066 *** 0.013 0.226 * 0.119 0.053 *** 0.012 0.271 0.231
First stage F -Stat 30.4 5.9
Without those households having produced less than 250kg cotton (removes 8.6% (9.2%) from sample)
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.062 *** 0.013 0.410 * 0.224 0.051 *** 0.012 0.600 0.394
First stage F -Stat 10.3 3.1
Without those households where cotton income share less than 10% (removes 3.9% (4.0%) from sample)
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.061 *** 0.013 0.229 ** 0.109 0.048 *** 0.012 0.347 ** 0.149
First stage F -Stat 39.9 17.9
Without those households where cotton income share less than 50% (removes 10.0% (10.8%) from sample)
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.065 *** 0.012 0.223 ** 0.106 0.053 *** 0.012 0.287 * 0.151
First stage F -Stat 41.9 15.6
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Table 6 (... continued.)
Notes: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and permit within-family correlations among unobservables. ∗ significant at the
10% level, ∗∗ significant at the 5% level, ∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level. Regressions correspond to those presented in Table 5 (columns (1), (2), (7) and (8)).
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations by the author.
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In the next row, I exclude all households who joined the cotton sector after
1997 from the estimation. This removes about seven percent of all children
in my sample. The F -statistics for boys and girls increase substantially. The
instrumented income effect for boys is close to the estimate in Table 5 and for
girls the effect decreases and is now similar to the effect for boys.
Another way of dealing with the problem of households which switched to
cotton production is to exclude those households which produced only rela-
tively small quantities of cotton. The assumption is that new cotton farmers
allocate on average less land to cotton than well-experienced cotton farmers.15
Of course, the risk is that this systematically excludes cotton farmers who do
not have much land and are thus relatively poor. I use two alternative cut-off
points. The first eliminates all farmers who produced less than 50kg of cotton,
which removes about five percent of the cotton farmers from the sample. The
second cut-off point eliminates all farmers who produced less than 250kg of cot-
ton, which removes about nine percent of the cotton farmers from the sample.16
With the first cut-off point the results for boys lead to a lower IV estimate and
a similar first-stage F -statistic. For girls the instrument becomes weak and the
income effect turns out be insignificant. Using the second cut-off point, the in-
strumentation also looses its power for boys and the instrumented income effect
goes substantially up. However, the second cut-off point is really far beyond
the upper boundary and obviously removes not only many ‘newcomers’, but
many poor cotton farmers as well.
Finally, I exclude those households from the cotton sample which draw only
a relatively small share of their total agricultural income from cotton. Again I
use two cut-off points, the first at ten percent (removing about four percent of
all cotton households from the sample) and the second at 50 percent (removing
about ten percent). In all cases, for boys and girls, the F -statistics go up, that
is what one expects. Of course the higher the share of income a household
draws from cotton, the more its income was (positively) affected in 1998. The
IV estimates of the income effect go down for boys and girls, more so when
the higher cut-off point is used. With the 50 percent cut-off point the income
elasticity of enrolment is 0.223 for boys and 0.287 for girls. Both effects are
significant.
I also tested whether all results hold if instead of removing those households
which probably recently joined, I added them to the group of food crop farmers,
i.e. if I left them in their initial group. The results were very similar. All effects
hold, except for the variant where those households are defined as ‘joiners’,
which earned less than 50% of their agricultural income from cotton production,
which again is a very high threshold.
These robustness checks suggest that activity changes do not drive the re-
sults and do not lead to a substantial bias in my estimates. Thus, income
matters. The true average income effect seems to be between 0.22 and 0.28,
15Note that the size of the plots allocated to cotton and cultivated land size in general is
not available in the surveys.
16Note that quantities can only be computed approximately since respondents had the pos-
sibility to provide the quantities in terms of the number of baskets, sacks etc. This information
was then converted into kg.
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that is between three and four times the OLS effect. It is important to note
that the OLS estimate might be strongly downward biased, not only because
of a ‘simultaneity bias’ but also because of ‘measurement error bias’.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I analyzed the impact of a drought and resulting food price infla-
tion on parental decisions to send their children to school. Moreover, I used the
fact that in Burkina Faso food crop farmers and cotton farmers where exposed
differently to that shock to estimate the income elasticity of school enrolment.
The results suggest that the loss of purchasing power, even if temporary, can
have a severe impact on children’s schooling. Between 1994 and 1998 Burkinabe`
food crop farmers experienced on average a decline of more than 30 percent in
their income. This led to a substantial cut in their spending on education and
a drop of more than ten percent in enrolment rates. This corresponds to more
than 100,000 children which were not enrolled or were withdrawn from school
during that period. In other words, instrumental variable estimates suggest
that a decline in income by ten percent causes a decline in enrolment rates
among children six to thirteen years old by about 2.2 to 2.8 percentage points,
i.e. this impact is three to four times higher than what a simple OLS regression
would suggest.
This is a further piece of evidence that income matters for children’s school
enrolment. However, so far existing evidence comes mostly from developed
countries or from Latin-America and South-Asia, and is often based on an
analysis of conditional cash transfer programs. Given the conditionality in
these latter programs it is generally difficult to derive from them the direct
effect of parental income. In addition, it is unlikely that these results can be
generalized to the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. Given that this region has by
far the lowest education levels in the world, the results from this paper might
be particularly relevant.
In the coming years substantial resources will be spent on programs to
increase school enrolment rates in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results of this
study suggest that decision-makers should not only focus on the supply side
of education, like school construction and the training of teachers, but should
also implement measures to strengthen the demand side. That can be done
directly by providing cash transfers to households17 or indirectly by undertaking
interventions which help increase the incomes of poor rural households. This
can include investments in rural infrastructure, agricultural productivity and
the provision of opportunities to diversify income sources. Of course the study
also highlights that measures which help households to smooth income over time
can prevent children from dropping out of school if households face negative
income shocks. Time is pressing. In Burkina Faso for instance, between June
17Such transfers could in principle be made conditional on enrolment. But it should be noted
that monitoring can be very costly, in particular in a setting of weak institutions. Moreover,
some studies suggest that the effects of conditionality are not always very large (see De Brauw
and Hoddinott, 2008.
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2007 and June 2008 cereal consumer prices rose again by 110.1%.18
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